Regulatory threats to the law degree: the Solicitors Qualifying Examination and the purpose of law schools by Bowyer, RA
Vol.:(0123456789)
Law and Critique (2019) 30:117–121
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10978-019-09243-w
1 
Regulatory Threats to the Law Degree: The Solicitors 
Qualifying Examination and the Purpose of Law Schools
Richard Bowyer1
Published online: 4 May 2019 
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
Two major regulatory changes are affecting the provision of undergraduate legal 
education in England and Wales. On the one hand, the Qualifying Law Degree is 
being deregulated, meaning law schools are free to make significant changes to how 
and what they teach. On the other hand, higher education in England has seen a 
significant overhaul through the creation of the Office for Students, which treats stu-
dents as consumers. Now more than ever, law schools need to ask themselves exis-
tential questions which will not only test their continued relevance or indeed viabil-
ity within the ‘market’ for higher education, but also the status of the discipline of 
law as a whole. The regulatory landscape may indeed present a significant threat, 
but it is also an opportunity to reflect on what law schools are for, and consequently 
what changes could result from the academic freedom that comes with deregulation. 
Whilst different law schools will interpret their mission differently, they should cau-
tion against either generalised inertia or succumbing to an outcomes-oriented provi-
sion that simply prepares students for the new Solicitors Qualifying Examination. 
Instead, law schools will find their proper purpose in critical reflection and academic 
self-grounding, providing undergraduate students with a ‘question everything’ men-
tality, and showing them that law is something to be experienced and not merely 
learnt.
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With the anticipated arrival of the Solicitors Regulation Authority’s (SRA) new cen-
tralised exams for qualification of a solicitor in England and Wales, we are again 
forced to address the question: what are universities (or law schools) for? Unless 
law schools take charge of this question themselves, the answer will be derived from 
governmental or regulatory norms concerned with value for money, employment 
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outcomes, and consumer rights. Law schools in England sit between two regula-
tors which are part of the same neoliberal apparatus that is reducing everyone to 
the status of a consumer. The SRA, on the one hand, has ceased to participate in 
the regulation of legal education as learning, and focused instead on administering 
their own exams assessing outcomes—all in the name of protecting the consumer of 
legal services (SRA 2015). The Office for Students (OfS), on the other hand, ren-
ders students themselves as consumers by adopting the Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA) approach to Higher Education as a service rendered (OfS 2018). 
Any government-identified socially useful public good associated with universities 
or law degrees—such as widening participation or fair access—is added on top: the 
surplus value of running the marketised university. If law schools succumb to these 
regulatory norms, they will become training suites for the SRA’s exams, producing 
tomorrow’s ‘minimally competent’ solicitors whose salaries will be tracked by Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs for several years after graduation, to ensure that the 
public cost of administering the loan book has provided the taxpayer-consumer with 
value for money.1 Law schools must take charge of the question of their rightful pur-
pose, if they are to avoid their reduction to marketised utility.
As John Donne almost said, no regulator is an island. The SRA, however, has a 
different view. They have construed their own purpose extremely narrowly by think-
ing that the best way of protecting consumers of legal services is to assess entry 
standards of would-be solicitors for themselves. The Solicitors Qualifying Examina-
tion (SQE) will use multiple choice tests, legal research and writing skills assess-
ments, and practical skills assessments to determine minimal competency. The over-
all cost of the exams will be in the range of £3000–£4500, and therefore promises to 
be much less than the current cost of a Legal Practice Course (SRA 2018). By not 
regulating the degree education required for entry to the profession (entrants can 
have any degree or equivalent Level 6 or 7 qualification or apprenticeship), the SRA 
expects a whole range of degree and non-degree education courses to feed into the 
SQE. Data on provider success rates for the SQE will be published, encouraging or 
incentivising SQE alignment for many current providers of law degrees. Now that 
the OfS has realised that it too is an island, it has publicly stated that it will let 
failing universities fail, which is precisely the opposite function of its predecessor 
organisation, Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), which was 
the university’s fund of last resort.
The ‘market’ for legal education will become increasingly stratified as a con-
sequence of these regulatory initiatives. Some law schools will see themselves as 
untouchable, and will go on maintaining their place in the economy of producing 
the next crop of law firm partners. The SQE is, of course, a necessary qualifying 
step, but employers will still want to know how you qualified, or more simply where 
you studied. Other law schools will need to decide whether they align to SQE, or 
do something else. Whatever the specific response to the SQE, law schools should 
1 Longitudinal Education Outcomes (LEO) links earnings data held by the tax office to the university 
and course attended by those taxpayer/graduates. The Teaching Excellence Framework and the OfS use 
this metric to assess the performance of higher education providers.
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ensure they protect, nurture and develop what law schools are for, which must not 
be understood in the terms given to them by the pincer claws of our two regula-
tors. A reduction of the law school to the requirements of its professional regulatory 
body would leave it open to future irrelevance or obsolescence. As Derrida warned: 
‘Beware of what opens the university to the outside… but also of what, closing in on 
itself, would create only an illusion of closure, would make the university available 
to any sort of interest, or else render it perfectly useless’ (Derrida 2004, p. 153).
It is perhaps easier to say what universities should not be for, than to establish a 
stable sense of origins and ends. We might resolve that universities (or law schools) 
should not be about meeting a market demand for solicitors, and that our saying 
so would be an act of our academic freedom or autonomy, as if freedom was the 
point of universities. This freedom is a freedom for disciplines to govern them-
selves. However, Judith Butler’s (2009) defence of academic freedom, including 
‘academic self-governance’, identifies an enigma. Academic departments enjoying 
freedom over their own governance and curricula choices are maintaining those 
choices according to disciplinary norms and practices. But in whose interests are 
those norms maintained? If established disciplinary norms give validity to current 
and future practices, ‘we establish a conservative academic culture and even sup-
press disciplinary innovation’ (Butler 2009, p. 774). If we defend our position in the 
face of external regulatory pressure, then Butler reminds us that we must do better in 
articulating what grounds our academic freedom.
Butler’s response is to commit ourselves to critique. Drawing on Foucault and 
others, Butler explains that the task is to ensure that we do not become ‘ungovern-
able for all time’, but rather that we resist being ‘governed in this or that way’ (2009, 
p. 791). Rather than critique as ‘nay-saying’ or ‘nihilism’, it is about critique as ‘that 
revolution at the level of procedure without which we cannot secure rights of dissent 
and processes of legitimation’ (2009, p. 795). It is dissent, in the face of processes of 
governmentality, or in the foreclosure of what is possible, that provides this neces-
sary procedural right which is also a form of self-grounding for the freedoms that 
establish our position as academics, disciplines and the university. In her reading 
of Antigone (and Lacan), Butler further explained her turn to origins or grounds. 
Rather than seeing Antigone as fatalistic, she represented something else: commu-
nicability that recalls the origin upon which society (or kinship) is based, before the 
‘hasty foreclosures’ of the state (Butler 2000, p. 55). Butler’s turn to origins—which 
we follow here as we find the grounds of academic freedom—is something which is 
open-textured about what is possible, not what is merely given or received. In short: 
the origins can be changed. The university (and the law school) must rediscover its 
origins in the face of these new external threats that are seeking to steer universities 
towards an outcomes-based, ends-oriented education.
We have now established that universities are grounded, albeit in a self-grounding 
sort of way. They are, at most, procedurally grounded. Universities are essentially 
about the processes of critique, and cannot be reduced to, or in the exclusive service 
of, professional norms and practices that exist outside the university.
Adopting a critical standpoint in relation to the external regulatory environment 
does not mean that the discipline of law is immune from revaluation or change—
but that change should come from within. We can recall Butler’s earlier point that 
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maintaining disciplines according to disciplinary norms would be an inherently con-
servative practice because the discipline would authorise itself according to existing 
or long-standing norms and practices in an uncritical sort of way. If we are adopting 
a critical position in relation to our regulators, then we should be prepared to do 
likewise with our own discipline too.
Law, like many of the other disciplines, is something which does indeed have a 
life outside of the university campus. And the discipline of law has regularly rein-
vented itself in response to the inside/outside of law’s being. Notable examples have 
included the approach of the legal realists, critical race theory, critical legal studies, 
and legal feminism—all of which emerged out of a critical response to law in its 
more dogmatic forms. There is also a growing practice of ‘law and…’, as we under-
take interdisciplinary approaches and methods in order to see law from a different 
vantage point, or to produce cross-disciplinary affects. Law schools have indeed 
taken a critical stand in relation to the established or dogmatic forms of law, but 
these enterprises have been mostly felt in our research or in our postgraduate teach-
ing. Now that the undergraduate law degree is being fully deregulated—at least as 
far as the SRA is concerned—would it not be a great opportunity to radically reform 
our undergraduate law curricula, in defence of our discipline and in spite of the reg-
ulatory environment?
The striking thing about most undergraduate law programmes in England is how 
similar many of them are. Most, but not all, law schools approach law primarily 
through a content-based view of the subject. Because of the way the law degree 
has been regulated, this typically follows a pattern of just over half of the degree 
comprising ‘core’ modules specified by the SRA and the Bar Standards Board 
(BSB), and a range of options normally featuring towards the latter stages of the 
degree. Closed-book exams are a very common form of assessment, although they 
are no longer formally required by the SRA or BSB. Some variation exists, particu-
larly in respect of how the subject of law is approached: ‘black-letter’ or doctrinal 
approaches could be contrasted with socio-legal and ‘law in context’ approaches. 
But otherwise most law degrees try to do very similar things in very similar ways, of 
course with some exceptions.
One of the better things that could come out of this coming regulatory environ-
ment is for law schools to bring their practices of critique to the undergraduate cur-
riculum. Doing law could now mean a whole host of things other than doctrinal 
learning. Indeed, it must mean more than simply learning the law, as otherwise the 
university law degree would be undercut by other private providers of SQE ‘cram-
ming’ courses. The thing which has been neglected under the SRA/BSB ‘qualifying 
law degree’ has been the experience of law: activism, resistance, law clinic activi-
ties. Law degrees could be a site of radical critique, of a ‘question everything’ men-
tality, with activism, dissent and practice at its heart. Students can bring critique to 
law, and become something far more than the minimally competent solicitors envis-
aged by the SRA’s exams.
Law schools will now be free to teach as they wish. Freedom is a heavy respon-
sibility. Some law schools will do nothing (or next to nothing) out of fear of change, 
generalised inertia, or because the regulator continues on as some sort of internal-
ised superego. To paraphrase Freud, the SRA may be stronger in its absence. Others 
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will want to keep aligned with the BSB anyway, as a mark of quality or the percep-
tion of rigour. There will be a section of the market for law schools that will have 
no choice but to do something towards the SQE direction, because they are already 
struggling with student numbers following the abolition of student number caps that 
came with £9000 fees. Whatever law schools do, it is important that they keep some 
of their identity as a university discipline, so they do not fold into the regulatory 
abyss, where they could very quickly become irrelevant.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Butler, Judith. 2000. Antigone’s claim: Kinship between life and death. New York: Columbia University 
Press.
Butler, Judith. 2009. Critique, dissent, disciplinarity. Critical Inquiry 35: 773–795.
Derrida, Jacques. 2004. Eyes of the university (trans: Jan Plug et al.). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Office for Students (OfS). 2018. Securing student success: Regulatory framework for higher education in 
England. https ://www.offic efors tuden ts.org.uk/media /1406/ofs20 18_01.pdf. Accessed 3 Feb 2019.
Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA). 2015. Training for tomorrow: Assessing competence. https ://
www.sra.org.uk/docum ents/SRA/consu ltati ons/t4t-sqa-consu ltati on.pdf. Accessed 3 Feb 2019.
Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA). 2018. SQE to be introduced in Autumn 2021. https ://www.sra.
org.uk/sra/news/press /sqe-launc h-2021.page. Accessed 3 Fe 2019.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
